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1 Introduction
Switches, routers, and many other networking devices are the key components in
our daily used Internet. The increasing demands of improvement in the network-
ing capabilities and performance have driven the network engineers to innovate new
methodologies and developing perspectives for enhancing and improving the network
architecture. A new development perspective to continue the network technology
evolution has been introduced, the Software-Defined Networking (SDN).
The Ethernet, which is the dominant networking technology in Local Area Networks
(LAN), is in crisis. Developed initially decades ago, the prime function of the Eth-
ernet was to serve a flexible and a decentralized network. Since then, Ethernet has
progressed to serve expanded networks with high capacity, yet leaving the archi-
tectural security with little attention. Furthermore, popular emerging networking
technologies such as network virtualization use extended Ethernet segments. Due
to the lack of routing in Ethernet, such technologies suffer from inefficiency in trans-
mission.
Otherwise, network security has been improving rapidly over the past years. As
new protocols and proprietary technologies are developed to secure communication
between and within the hosts and other network devices, many vulnerabilities are
still present with no current resolution. Experts face challenges as their solutions are
constrained by the concept of how the legacy network operates. The legacy network
is generally constructed with distributed intelligence. This appears as the nodes of
the network handle their behavior according to the adjacent node. This directs se-
curity experts to resolve the security issues in restricted manner. By choice, security
issues would be easier to tackle if the control over the whole network would be given
to the security entity.
The main unique feature which makes SDN popular is its ability to make a network
programmable. The new emerging technology has the potential to revolutionize
the networking industry in many ways. Nevertheless, security aspects have to be
managed and evaluated in order to provide reliable networks. Therefore, research
of SDN capabilities to overcome legacy Ethernet security issues is needed.
This thesis aims to answer the question of how to improve Ethernet LAN security
utilizing SDN properties, and which challenges can be expected. The network se-
curity is discussed in a broad manner, but the main focus is set on the Ethernet
LAN. Existing SDN security solutions are reviewed and security issues prevailing
in the Ethernet networks are discussed from the SDN point of view. In addition, a
proposal for security enforcing SDN solution is introduced and evaluated. Yet, the
further objective of this thesis is to open up a door for discussion and innovation in
the research community to confront security challenges in SDN.
The result of the thesis shows that, SDN can provide means to dominate a network,
2and hence, improve its security. SDN security can be seen as an own development
field which aims to overcome all legacy network vulnerabilities and improve networks
reliability and integrity. Although, SDN is not airtight, the central entity (namely
controller) of a SDN network represents a single point of failure. The network is
in complete submission to the controller which becomes a threat when its compro-
mised. As long as the the access to the controller is restricted, SDN can bring many
advantages for network security improvement. This thesis contributes to the further
SDN security development and research, by providing possible SDN solutions to
overcome legacy Ethernet security threats and by presenting an example of a secure
SDN network.
The structure is as follows, Chapter 2 explains the reader the background knowledge
needed, with defining SDN, its own standard OpenFlow, the basics of Ethernet and
Ethernet’s security protocols and also reviews existing SDN security implementa-
tions and discusses the possible future trends of the security of SDN. In Chapter 3, a
survey discussing Ethernet security is discussed by proposing a solution to improve
Ethernet’s security with SDN. In Chapter 4, a proposal for a SDN security imple-
mentation is presented and evaluated. Finalized by Chapter 5, which discusses the
development directions to SDN security solutions and concludes this thesis.
32 Background
In this chapter, the required background information is explained in order to un-
derstand the thesis’ notion. Firstly, Software-Defined Networking is defined and
explained. This is followed by explaining its standardized protocol OpenFlow and
by defining the overall view of the existing Ethernet security protocols and tech-
niques. Related work are presented and interpreted and additionally the future
trends and possible challenges will be investigated.
2.1 Software-Defined Networking
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) concept was first time introduced in 2010 [1] as
the new networking paradigm which aims to ease the control and the management
of a computer network environment.
SDN can be explained as an architectural principle where the networks control and
the management are centralized and decoupled from data plane, thus making the
network programmable. To quote the definition paraphrased from the HotSDN ’12
Solicitation:
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a refactoring of the relationship
between network devices and the software that controls them.
Traditionally, the data and the control planes in the Ethernet networking devices
(and most of the communication principles) have been tied together. This means,
the prevailing operating system and its features with the provided hardware are im-
plemented in a single device. Therefore, network devices, such as switches, routers,
firewalls, etc., are built with the intelligence of handling traffic relative to the adja-
cent devices. This makes the intelligence distributed and scattered in the network.
In addition, most of the network devices are Command Line Interface (CLI) based
and configuration is done separately per device, making configuration slow and prone
to errors. This prevents the networking industry of responding quickly to feature
requests or innovate new management abilities. [2]
The data plane has a sensible layering model which is known by the name Open Sys-
tems Interconnection model (OSI model)[3]. It is well know model in the networking
industries and academies. It is standardized by the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO). The OSI model enables network applications and services to
isolate the data operations to a single layer and provide interfaces between layers.
This has enforced developers to develop and improve the operations without con-
cerning the other layers. This type of layering models are used in many other fields
(e.g. operating system) and it has provided simplicity to understand the overall
view and the interactions. As a result, we can witness increase in the development
and research in these fields. As it seems, similar layering model is essentially needed
for networks control and management plane, which was not available. This creates
4the need to invent a new networking architecture, SDN.
SDN architecture decouples control from data plane and provides it a new layering
model. Open Networking Foundation (ONF) [4] is a non-profit industry consortium
which has taken the lead in standardizing critical elements for SDN architecture.
One of these standards is OpenFlow, which will be covered in the next section. ONF
has defined the following layering scheme for SDN architecture.
Applicat ion Layer
Infrastructure Layer
Control  Layer
ApplicationApplicationApplication
Northbound API
Southbound API
SDN Controller
Software
Configuration
&
Properties
Network devices
&
Hardware
Figure 1: The SDN stack.
As seen from the Figure 1, SDN architecture is divided into three layers: application
layer, control layer, and infrastructure layer. This architecture and arrangement of
control and management, provides the possibility to centralize the state of the net-
work and the intelligence into one part of the network. This, enhances the property
of network programmability, the network industry can start to innovate and enable
differentiation in the developing process. Furthermore, programmability accelerates
creativity and introduction of new network features and services. With centraliza-
tion, SDN simplifies provisioning while optimizing performance and granularity of
the policy management. Therefore, SDN can make networks become more scalable,
flexible and proactive. SDN architecture stack abstracts and decouples hardware
from software, control plane from forwarding plane, and physical from logical con-
figuration.
Infrastructure layer is the layer where all the hardware exists and are connected
physically. On these hardware devices runs a software which provides a control data
plane interface (Southbound API ) which is used to communicate with the upper
level: Control layer.
5Control layer is the most important layer in the architecture. There is a controller
which talks to all the network devices in the infrastructure and keeps track of the
topology. While exchanging information of the network state with upper layer ap-
plications (through (Northbound API ), the controller translates their commands to
the network devices to have respective and desired network behavior.
Application layer is the layer where all the features, services and policies are de-
fined. Applications request the information of network devices and the topology in
order to to act upon it. These applications can create features end-to-end and make
big picture decisions according to the changes in the network. When the network
topology, feature, or policy requirements changes, applications have the control to
change dynamically the network behavior from one single point.
Between these layers, there are Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) which
provide the essential communication tools between the layers. The Northbound API
is provided by the controller and the applications have to manage their communi-
cation to the controller through it. At the time of writing this thesis, there was
no standards for this interface, yet many SDN controllers were settling down with
REST API [2]. Other popular API’s are C++, JAVA and Python. The Southbound
API is the communication between the controller and the network devices. In the
following section, a protocol providing this feature shall be further discussed.
Applicat ion Layer
Infrastructure Layer
Control  Layer
Network devices
&
Hardware
Applicat ion LayerAppl icat ion Layer
Control  LayerControl  Layer
Hyperv isor
Southbound API
Northbound APINorthbound APINorthbound API
North/Southbound API
Figure 2: The SDN stack with Hypervisor(slicing).
The SDN layer model can be adjusted to fit and satisfy a data center scheme. Where
virtualization may need logical network segment slicing. In this case an extra layer
is added in the model (see Figure 2) and the controller of controllers, also called the
Hypervisor, can provide logical slicing (while physically network is untouched). In
6other words, the Hypervisor allows every individual controller to control only their
own hosts (physical or virtual) on the network without affecting other parts of the
network.
SDN brings new challenges in networking technology and in this thesis the focus is
set on the network security. A programmable network provides full control of a net-
work. Thus, bringing more capabilities to handle security in the network, whether in
a local area network (LAN) or in the core. Similarly, new unexplored threats against
a SDN network can be unveiled or discovered. Nevertheless, SDN has gained rapidly
its reputation and is the biggest hype word in networking business.
2.2 OpenFlow
As mentioned in the previous section, the communication between network devices
and the controller is handled through the southbound API of the controller. As
the most dominant networking technology is the Ethernet, the first standard for
SDN was created to manage the controlling of Ethernet switches. OpenFlow [5] is a
standardized (by ONF) protocol for SDN supported networks to handle the commu-
nication between Ethernet switches and the SDN controller. OpenFlow was derived
from SANE [6] and Ethane [7], which were one of the first projects to decouple
control and data plane. OpenFlow shortly started to become more popular and as
an open standard, it developed quickly to support more and more functionalities.
Figure 3: The three main parts of an OpenFlow switch [8].
A switch which supports OpenFlow, initially consist of three essential parts [8](see
Figure 3): flow and group table(s), OpenFlow channel, and OpenFlow protocol.
As OpenFlow is relatively young and it continues on developing, new functionalities
7and improvements change OpenFlow’s properties to suite current network demands.
Therefore in this section, only the essential parts of OpenFlow will be explained and
other improvements and version differences are explained later on according to re-
ferral need.
Using OpenFlow protocol, a controller can learn Ethernet switches’ hardware details,
connectivity status, and the network topology; while commanding its forwarding ta-
ble behavior by giving flow rules.
Flow and group tables define switches behavior with data flow coming from
different interfaces (physical, virtual). The table consists of a set of rules, where
the flow of the communication data is defined. The Switch reacts upon every flow
according to the rules, called flow rules. An OpenFlow switch has one or more flow
tables and a group table for frame lookups and forwarding. A flow rule consists of
three fields (see Figure 4):
– Rule: a header to match with the frames of the flows. There are several
supported Ethernet headers in OpenFlow specification [8], but as OpenFlow
is made to be extensible, custom headers can be additionally defined. The
switch merely performs a bit mask match. Therefore, OpenFlow switch is
open for innovative non-IP traffic.
– Action: as a rule is matched with traffic, the action which should be performed
for it has to be defined. The actions are also open for extensions, but some
basic actions are already provided in the specification. Such as, forwarding to
one or more ports, forward to the controller, drop the frame, and modify frame
fields. The only requirement for adding customized actions is that the data
path must have flexibility while providing high performance and low cost.
– Statistics : Each and every time when a flow rule is matched, the switch has to
update the frame counters, which indicates the popularity of a specific flow.
There are counters for every table, each flow, all the ports and every queue.
Also a timer of last activity and initial set of the flow are maintained.
An OpenFlow channel is the connection between the switch and the controller.
This channel is usually encrypted with Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol,
however, the channel can also be run by using plain Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP). The OpenFlow channel provides an interface for the controller to manage
and adjust flow and group tables of the OpenFlow switch. Concurrently, the switch
also supplies the controller with its hardware information, the connectivity status
of ports, and meter statistics of every flow rule.
The OpenFlow protocol predefines the communication message pattern which is
used when communicating between the controller and the switch or between the
switches.
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Figure 4: An example of an OpenFlow flow rule table.
2.3 Ethernet and Security
The IEEE 802.3 [9], better known as Ethernet transmission, started out in the mid-
seventies as a simple method of communicating between computers [10]. Rapidly, it
became the de facto standard [11] for the local area networks (LANs) due to its sim-
ple nature. Regardless, Ethernet’s security aspects were not considered or designed
at its early stages. As the networks grew and security became more critical, some
security enhancements began to affect the Ethernet. The different security issues
troubling Ethernet cannot be detected from upper layer protocols. Therefore, fo-
cusing on improving Ethernet’s security and reliability is a great importance. Thus,
with SDN in the picture, questions can be raised: is it necessary for Ethernet to get
an architectural upgrade? Does it improve the security?
In this section the basic principles of legacy Ethernet are briefly explained and those
standards and protocols which are relevant to the notion of this thesis are presented.
2.3.1 Plain Ethernet Network
A plain Ethernet network (mostly LAN) consists of hosts and switches. Switches
are used to connect the host with each other creating a network. The topology in
simplest form is a star, but while connecting switches with each other, it creates a
mesh topology. The hosts are required to have a 48-bit universal LAN MAC ad-
dress [12] (shortly MAC address) to each of its Ethernet interfaces connected to the
network. The switches need to keep track of host MAC addresses connected to it to
be able to guide the traffic.
As the communication traffic is packet based (IP packets), in the Ethernet, the pack-
ets are encapsulated in an Ethernet frame. These frames are packed with Ethernet
headers containing the source and the destination. The creation and resolving of
Ethernet frames is handled by the hosts and the switches inspect only the headers
for forwarding purposes.
9An Ethernet switch has multiple interfaces (Ethernet ports) for internal switching.
The switch’s main task is to forward Ethernet frames from one port to the other,
with the respect of its destination. Therefore, the switch maintains a record of which
MAC addresses are connected to which port. This table is called Content Address-
able Memory (CAM). Initially, the switch does not know the MAC addresses of
its connected hosts, the information is collected when the hosts send an Ethernet
frame. The switch will learn, while forwarding the frame, the source MAC address.
The MAC port pair is added if it was not added earlier. Using this same table
the switch knows to which port it needs to forward the frame. In case there is no
match, the switch floods it, which means that it sends the frame out of all of its port
(except the port where the frame came from). According to the Ethernet’s princi-
ple, the host should only take frames which are destined to itself, others are dropped.
Generally, an Ethernet switch has three main components:
– Data plane: Is responsible for the actual forwarding of the Ethernet frame
from one port to the other.
– Control plane: Takes care of updating the CAM and manages the network
topology such as Spanning Tree Protocol (STP).
– Management plane: Is used to carry out the personal network configurations
and other features such as virtual LAN’s (VLAN’s).
Even though, physically, LAN’s have star or mesh shaped topology, logically, the
network is always viewed as a tree. It is also possible to divide the physically created
network into smaller logically divided networks. These are called Virtual Local Area
Network (VLAN). This is the means to connect the host to the same LAN without
the locational restriction. [13] [14]
In the case of a mesh network, for redundancy reasons, in the network may occur
loops. This is not so convenient in the Ethernet’s point of view since the network is
logically a tree. This is why a protocol called Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) is used.
STP gives each switch a priority and it detects the loops in the network. One of
the switches is initially selected as a root switch, and by sending specific messages
it can detect the network and disable the connections which create loops. If an
active link is suddenly not available (i.e. due to link failure), the switches give no-
tice about their state and the disabled connections can be reactivated for repair. [15]
2.3.2 Host Connectivity Management
For host connectivity in the IP, some layer 3 protocols are tightly related to Eth-
ernet’s behavior. Relevant for this thesis we have to inspect two of them: Dy-
namic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [16] and Address Resolution Protocol
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(ARP) [17].
As explained before, hosts has a unique MAC address for each networking inter-
face. To locate other hosts in the same LAN, IP addresses are needed. DHCP,
is the protocol for assigning IP addresses to the hosts. When a host requires an
IP address, it has to locate the DHCP server and communicate with it. In return
DCHP server responds with an IP address with its lease time and other network
related information (such as netmask, gateway address and Domain Name System
(DNS) [18] [19] servers).
After gaining an IP address, the host can connect to other hosts in the same LAN.
Nevertheless, since Ethernet frames use MAC addresses instead of IP addresses,
ARP is used. With ARP, a host sends a broadcast message to the LAN requesting
the recipient host (with the specific IP address) to reply. After the reply, the host
assigns the MAC address to the specific IP address.
Figure 5: An example of ARP communication process.
2.3.3 Legacy Ethernet Security Solutions
Most of the network security solutions are implemented in the higher layers (layers
3-5). Some lower level solutions are also available but most of them are vendor
provided proprietary solutions. From the popular and standardized solutions, in
this thesis are discussed: firewall [20], Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) [21], Intrusion
Prevention Systems (IPS) [22], and IEEE 802.1X [23] [24].
One of the most popular security systems is a firewall. Firewalls’ main task is to
filter and protect a host or a LAN from unwanted communication traffic. The term
firewall is very generic as there are dozens of different implementations. The imple-
mentations vary depending on how deeply the traffic must be investigated (layers
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3-5). A simple firewall can prevent traffic according to initially defined IP header
variables (layer 3) and it is more suitable for network protection and a bit more
sophisticated firewall at the host can follow connection sessions and prevent initially
defined illegal connections.
Sometimes firewalls are enhanced with DPI functionality which scans the traffic at
the application layer (layer 5). This is done by examining each passing IP packet’s
content (past the headers) for suspicious data. Thus, firewalls with DPI have the
ability to identify applications and higher level protocol attacks.
DPI is also used in IPS. IPSs’ task is to investigate the passing traffic and as the
name reveals, prevent intrusion into the system or the network. IPSs’ detection sys-
tem compares the passing traffic with its known attack database and thus protects
the traffic from malicious attackers.
Although above mentioned solutions secure higher layer communication, they are
frequently used while implementing Ethernet LAN. Regardless, IEEE 802.1X is
a standardized solution to upgrade Ethernet security level with the authentication
feature. As a host connects to an Ethernet switch, it has to send its credentials
in order to acquire connectivity. The switch then confirms the authenticity of the
host from a remote authentication server. Thus only the authenticated hosts may
communicate in the network.
2.4 Related work
Currently, at the time of writing this thesis, a state of stillness prevails regarding
the solutions to improve network security with SDN and OpenFlow. However, there
are some current trendy implementations which are attracting network security spe-
cialists. In this chapter, these implementations will be presented and discussed.
2.4.1 FRESCO and SE-FLOODLIGHT
The Framework for Enabling Security Controls in OpenFlow networks (FRESCO) [25],
was introduced by SRI International and Texas A&M University in the ISOC Net-
work and Distributed System Security Symposium in San Diego on February 2013.
With the focus on the key issues of designing new security services in the OpenFlow
enabled network and enforcing creativity, adjustability, and deployability with cre-
ating network security solutions, FRESCO provides a new framework for developing
security applications in an OpenFlow network. In SDN architecture, FRESCO is
situated on the control and application layers, providing an OpenFlow controller
and a new application developing environment to create FRESCO supported secu-
rity applications. Applications are created using FRESCO’s own modular libraries
and scripting language, inspired by the Click [26] router architecture.
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FRESCO Security Enforcement Kernel The FRESCO’s controller is a mod-
ified version of NOX-classic controller. NOX-classic is a controller programmed in
C++ and Python, providing the possibility to create OpenFlow applications in both
languages and run many applications simultaneously. Unfortunately, NOX-classic
doesn’t handle applications flow rule creation conflicts as they can compete, contra-
dict, override each other. This creates vulnerabilities within the controller. Ergo,
the NOX-classic controller’s core is modified with a structural change by adding an
extension, FRESCO Security Enforcement Kernel (FRESCO SEK) (formerly known
as FortNOX [27]).
Figure 6: FRESCO architecture [25]
The FRESCO SEK’s task is to provide the controller with the ability to give Open-
Flow applications priorities and authorization. FRESCO SEK supplies the con-
troller role-based authorization and rule conflict detection, not only for FRESCO
applications, but also for other OpenFlow applications compatible with NOX-classic.
This offers FRESCO applications assurance that their flow rules are prioritized and
enforced over competing flow rules by non-security-critical applications. With role-
based authorization, FRESCO SEK provides a FRESCO application the possibility
to digitally sign the flow rule, hence, the controller can identify the flow rule and
determine if the rule originated from a FRESCO or an OpenFlow application, or
from a network administrator. As follows, upon a flow rule conflict, with FRESCO
SEK’s rule conflict detection mechanism, the controller knows whether a new flow
rule should be overwritten or should the old flow rule stay active on the network.
Obviously, non-security-critical OpenFlow applications have the chance to overwrite
a flow rule set by a FRESCO application, unless the network administrator gives
the authority. Nevertheless, when FRESCO applications conflict with each other,
the priority between them has to be set by the network administrator.
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FRESCO Application Layer FRESCO enables composing various network se-
curity functions, which are build using FRESCO’s own scripting API. Utilizing
FRESCO’s scripting language, security practitioners are enabled to use modular li-
braries to set up security monitoring and thread detection logics. These modules are
the basis processing units of a FRESCO application. A module is implemented as
an event-driven processing function which is defined and specified in Python. The
interactions of the module towards other modules and OpenFlow actions include five
different types of interfaces: (i) input, (ii) output, (iii) event, (iv) parameter, and
(v) action (see Figure 7). Only one event interface can be used per module, whereas
all the other interfaces can be defined multiple times per module (see Figure 7).
Figure 7: FRESCO Module [25]
Input and output are used for transmitting values from and to the module, event
interface is used to indicate when is the module’s action instantiated, parameter
interface for the module’s configuration on initialization values, and the action in-
terface is for indicating the desired OpenFlow command for the specific flow or a
packet. Utilizing these interfaces, modules can be combined, thus the possibility
of developing security applications while having centralized control over the whole
network, is opening up new varieties of possible security solutions over a network.
To introduce how creating a FRESCO application works in principle, a simple exam-
ple is examined. Lets create an application which works as a port comparator over a
network and lets give it a task of dropping all HTTP packets (port 80). This can be
created using only two modules. First module will be triggered with event incoming
flow, which means that every time there is a new flow coming in to a switch the
module gets instantiated. The input value will be packets’ destination port and as
a parameter we select 80. We shall trigger an action in the second module, so in the
first one we are left with the output interface which is the result of how the second
module will react. In the second module, the module is triggered with the push
event. This means that when there is a value on the input interface, this module
starts to operate. Here we do not need parameters or output interfaces. Neverthe-
less, there will be two action interface values: drop and forward. The function of
the port comparator can be observed from figure 8 below.
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Figure 8: FRESCO Port comparator [25]
The FRESCO application layer consists of two parts: FRESCO Development Envi-
ronment (FRESCODE) and FRESCO Resource Controller (FRESCO RC). FRESCO
DE provides the security researchers the tools and a platform to create and inno-
vate new network security monitoring and thread detection services. FRESCO DE
subsist of four main functions:
– Script-to-module translation, automatic conversion from FRESCO script
to module instances, where all the essential information is defined such as
which modules are used and how they are connected and what are the values of
their interfaces. Also, the validation of registering modules is performed. Each
FRESCO application gets a unique ID and encryption key pair. This allows
the encrypting of the FRESCO script and signing it to preserve authentication.
– Database management handles the assembling of the information concern-
ing the network and switch states. It provides sharing this information to
modules and between them. The database can be also used as a temporary
store for an instance.
– Event management is responsible for triggering the module instances which
are waiting for the predefined event to occur.
– Instance execution loads the generated module instances into the memory
in FRESCO framework. It also takes care to check if the application is autho-
rized to run.
Since FRESCO was built upon NOX-classic which supports up to the OpenFlow
1.1.0 specification, FRESCO does not use the new feature presented in OpenFlow
1.3 where switches can have multiple flow rule tables. Ergo, the flow table entries
are limited, FRESCO RC was created to keep track of the flow rule count in every
switch. FRESCO RC needs to handle the situations when a flow table fills up and
FRESCO RC has to decide which of the old flow rule will be replaced. Additionally,
when an old security sensitive flow rule gets removed from a switch, FRESCO RC
takes care that no new rule conflicts with the removed rule. This requires two main
functions:
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– The Switch monitor, which checks periodically the status of every switch in
the network and keeps track of the flow rule amount on the flow table.
– Garbage collection, monitors switch monitor details to react upon filling
up a switch flow table. When a predefined threshold of flow rule amount is
achieved, the garbage collector starts to remove the least active flow from the
switch.
FRESCO Example Application FRESCO developers have presented examples
of FRESCO security implementation in their paper. One of the notable implemen-
tations is Reflector Net, which discovers malicious scanner attacks and redirects
the attack to a third-party remote honeypot. Reflector Net was implemented us-
ing two modules, first module which discovers the scanner and the second module
which redirects the scanners flow to a honeypot for further investigation possibilities.
The malicious scanner’s intention is to find a host on a network with vulnerable
port, thus, the attacker will try to create a TCP connection on multiple ports per
host. Assuming that there is an external entity, which notifies FRESCO’s database
of large numbers of TCP connection fails. This information could be used to create
the event TCP_CONNECTION_FAIL, therefore triggering Reflector Net’s scanner
detector module. Which is followed with the triggering of a redirection of the scan-
ners flow to a designated honeypot. The flow of the attacker is identified using the
source IP of the flow that created the TCP_CONNECTION_FAIL event and Re-
flector Net’s scanner detector computes if the desired threshold of unsuccessful TCP
connections have been created by the same flow. When the threshold is reached,
the redirection module is triggered and therefore the flow is directed. The magic
behind this is that the attacker wont realize the detection and trapping of honeypot.
SE-FLOODLIGHT Security Enhanced Floodlight (SE-Floodlight) is a deriva-
tive of FRESCO, whereas FRESCO was built on NOX-classic OpenFlow controller,
SE-Floodlight is build on, as the name implies, Floodlight controller. SE-Floodlight
is still under development and beta releases are available. Principally, it is quite
similar to FRESCO except there is more functionality due to the extensions set
by the new OpenFlow specification. Also, as Floodlight is an actively developing
controller, SE-Floodlight has more possibilities to continue on its development after
initial release. [28]
2.4.2 FLOVER
SDN allows a network to be operated by many applications simultaneously. With
OpenFlow, these applications can communicate with network switches and com-
mand them to handle specific flows according to the desired functionality. Unfor-
16
Figure 9: The architecture of SE-Floodlight [29]
tunately, these applications may not have initially cooperation managed with each
other by the controller or any other element, and thus, conflicts and problems may
occur when they are set to operate. In addition, OpenFlow standard has not speci-
fied nor provided a built-in mechanism for checking application flow rule production
(statically or at runtime). This issue has an emphasized effect if one of the applica-
tions is a service maintaining security.
To address these type of issues, FLOVER was introduced at IEEE International
Conference on Communications June 2013 by SRI International, Texas A&M Uni-
versity, and University of Texas at Austin [30]. FLOVER is a model checking system,
which the main task is to verify that flow policies deployed by an OpenFlow appli-
cation do not violate the network’s security policies.
In the SDN architecture, FLOVER is implemented as an OpenFlow application but
logically it is situated parallel to the controller. The controller is modified to request
FLOVER’s approval on every new flow rule generation or modification. Initially, the
controller provides FLOVER with the security property information crucial to the
network, so FLOVER can inspect requested changes and respond to them. FLOVER
also uses the controller to access the current state and information about the net-
work, such as flow rule tables on the switches.
FLOVER introduces a new effective mechanism to ensure that a new flow rule,
generated dynamically by an OpenFlow application, does not offend or contradict
security properties set by the administrator or a security application, especially
non-bypass properties. By definition, a non-bypass property is a flow allow or deny
rule, which are defined statically to prohibit or permit flows through the network.
To examine this property, FLOVER addresses two types of non-bypass property
violations that may occur in an OpenFlow rule instance.
– First type is coverage violation, which occurs when in a flow table there is
an entry that violates a non-bypass property rule. For example, we assume
an OpenFlow switch with the flow table below. And we have a non-bypass
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Figure 10: The architecture of FLOVER
property rule as from source IP [5,6] no packets are allowed to destination IP
6. As seen from the third entry, it violates the rule, making it inconsistent.
– Second type is a modify violation, which arises, using the same example,
when a set command is used, as seen in the second entry. This violates the
non-bypass property rule by modifying the packet headers and so allowing the
flow to arrive at its original destination.
Table 1: Example of OpenFlow Flow Table with coverage and modify violation. [30]
Condition
Flow Field 1 Field 2 Field 3 Field 4 Action
Table Src IP Src Port Dst IP Dst Port Set
1 5 [0,19] 6 [0,19] drop
1 5 [0,19] [7,8] [0,19] set field 1 10, goto 2
1 6 [0,19] [6,8] [0,19] forward
2 [10,12] [0,19] [0,12] [0,19] set field 2 6, forward
If the prevailing OpenFlow specification version is at least 1.3.0, the switches flow
rule tables are enabled to be flexible and dynamic. This is due to multiple flow
tables and flow rule constructs created with set and goto table operations. There-
fore, FLOVER has selected Yices Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver [31]
to compute the satisfiability of the flow rule changes requested. Yices SMT solver
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uses Davis-Putnam-Logemann-Loveland (DPLL) algorithm to reach efficiently the
computing results. To compute with Yices SMT solver, FLOVER uses its Flow Ta-
ble Encoder which encodes the flow rule set, a collection of flow rules and specified
non-bypass properties into Yices code. Yices then computes whether non-bypass
properties are violated.
FLOVER runs as an OpenFlow application on a SDN controller and it has two
different execution modes to select from, in-line and batch.
– With the in-line mode, FLOVER is allowed to perform flow rule validation
for every new flow rule change.
– Batchmode is used to improve controllers’ response time, by allowing FLOVER
to run periodically. In this mode, FLOVER collects the current flow rule table
sets from every switch and checks if any violation has arisen.
FLOVER has taken up the challenge of resolving security issues in OpenFlow net-
works. In the paper, FLOVER developer team has run simulations and evaluated
the performance of FLOVER. It is critical to examine the effect of FLOVER over-
head on the flow rule approval and to realize if there might be small moments of
vulnerabilities present when using FLOVER in batch mode.
2.5 Future Trends
The presented security enforcing implementations are pioneering work performed in
the SDN security field. They provide extensive tools for creating security enforcing
SDN applications and the means to inspect SDN applications flow rule production.
Nevertheless, more pioneering and research needs to be done in the field to achieve
more secure and reliable SDN implementations, which prepares SDN solutions more
towards the production implementations.
Even though, at the writing time of this thesis, the development and the production
of SDN security solutions are still quite few in number, it is still a hot discussion
topic in many network security specialist circles [32], [33], [34], [35]. Considering
that SDN era is still at its beginning and there is still ground work to be done, it
is not wrong to assume that numerous companies and universities are participating,
developing, and investigating the matter and have not come out with their work to
public yet. The significance and importance of security in the SDN architecture is
crucial. As guaranteeing a protective communication is one of the core principles
of the networking technology, SDN has provided a new development principle and
it has inspired the security practitioners to proceed to invent new ways to provide
more secure way to communicate. In previous sections, some first publications of
security enforcement solutions were presented and interpreted. From these, common
focus issues and attention points can be extracted.
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In the future, it appears that the most security development in SDN will focus on
critical analysis of the security challenges posed by SDN and the exploration of po-
tential new defensive capabilities that SDN may enable [32]. It is clear that the
ground work is still ongoing and when most of the security challenges in SDN tech-
nologies have been tackled, SDN will have more influence on current network and
the commercial market.
According to a recent Gartner research [36], leading-edge enterprise data centers
are decoupling IT services from their hardware by shifting into a software-defined
model. This requires evolving of the security services to become more adaptive and
programmable. The vision of a software-defined data center is to virtualize all of its
IT infrastructure (such as storage, networking and computation) and shift them to
software defined paradigms. Therefore, it is necessary and essential to secure its all
software-based architectural elements and their APIs as well as necessary protocols
used in data center environment. Gartner proposes a new term, Software-Defined
Security (SDSec) and the implementation of it in to the practice in three phases:
– Phase 1: Securing Software-Defined Data Centers. In this phase, fo-
cus is to appropriately secure all software-defined elements, their interaction,
and the desired networking protocols and software defined applications. Pro-
posed measurements are to decryption, decoding, inspection, re-encryption,
authentication, and authorization.
– Phase 2: Integrating with the Software-Defined Infrastructure. To
have SDN enabled security policies, information security services and policy
enforcement should become more adaptive. Thus allowing, (SDN enforced
adaptive) networks to have their security policies while topology is changing
and adjusting. Demanding tremendous planning in security policy designing
principles and routines.
– Phase 3: Evolving into Software-Defined Security. As the last phase,
SDSec will evolve itself and become more software-defined. The security man-
agement plane will be decoupled from the security data plane and the security
policies will be managed holistically, enforcing security management with the
independence from the physical network topology and location.
2.6 Summary
In summary, SDN brings a new architectural platform to construct communication
networks. The core of SDN relies on the controller as it represents the operating
system of the network. The controller creates an interface for SDN applications to
communicate with the networking hardware and thus implementing new features to
a network becomes seamless. OpenFlow is the only standardized protocol of SDN
which task is to systematize the communication between the the controller and the
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switches.
Ethernet is a simple solution to create networks. The protocols which have been
built on top of it has made the security aspects challenging, due to their distributed
nature. It is still the dominant technology in the networking industry, and SDN did
not come to replace it, but rather change the method of operation and development.
Pioneer work in SDN security has started the pursuit to create more secure networks
with SDN. FRESCO, which evolved to SE-Floodlight, are platforms to create SDN
network upon a secure framework. The framework takes care of interoperability and
priorities the applications according to their secureness. FLOVER performs model
checking to a SDN network to recognize contradicting rules generated in the network.
Future of SDN depends on major companies implementing and securing Software-
Defined Data Centers, and integrating them with the SDN infrastructure. The
security will evolve into more software defined and thus fit better with SDN net-
works.
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3 Solutions for Increasing Ethernet’s Security with
Software-Defined Networking
IEEE 802.3 Ethernet technology is ubiquitous. In the Local Area Networks (LAN),
it is the most commonly used computer networking technology regardless of the
use-case environments [37]. Initially Ethernet was designed to create distributed
packet switching for low cost LAN’s [10]. Therefore, Ethernet did not include any
architectural security properties. Nonetheless, this allowed Ethernet to be easy to
deploy and to use, and hence, it becames the dominant technology.
In this chapter, Ethernet security vulnerabilities will be investigated according to the
survey [38] and a possible solution to overcome them using SDN will be presented. In
the legacy Ethernet network, the control and data planes go tight together, making
it easier for the attacker to find ways to attack these networks. In SDN, the control
plane is decoupled from the data plane, isolating the data flow from the control.
This makes it harder to target with several legacy network attacks. Nevertheless, as
SDN can tackle most of the Ethernet security issues, it brings new issues to discover
and to deal with.
The next sections answer each Ethernet threat presented in fore mentioned sur-
vey [38]. In each section there will be a brief description of the threat and the issue
in legacy Ethernet network, which is followed by a possible solution to overcome it
using SDN.
3.1 Network and System Access
To perform any attack to any network, the attacker has to gain access to it [39],
either by physically or by controlling existing resources. After the access, the at-
tacker can perform several different types of attacks. According to the paper [38], an
attacker can have five different motives to the attack: (1) learning about the private
network topology and the network traffic for use in a later attack, (2) gaining control
over switches, routers, or servers in the LAN, (3) eavesdropping, (4) manipulating
information, or (5) disrupting the availability of the network.
Unauthorized Joins and Expansion of the Network. The basic physical access
to a network is a threat if it has been done by an unauthorized person. Connecting
to an Ethernet segment in a plain legacy network is easy since the purpose of Ether-
net was to provide as little as possible administration overhead. This means that if
an unauthorized person access a switch, an existing host or a wall socket, which are
connected to the target segment, an unauthorized join is possible. From the design
of Ethernet network, expanding the network is possible by connecting a switch to
another switch. Therefore, if an attacker gains access to the network, the attacker
is permitted to expand the network for providing multiple access points (wired or
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wireless) to the target network.
Initially, the issue can be solved by limiting the access points. Keeping switches and
other network devices in secure and secret locations, providing the existing hosts and
switches authorized connections (i.e. with IEEE 802.1X [23] and EAP [40]), and by
maintaining the unused wall sockets to be disabled for connections. Nevertheless,
the maintenance of such a setting requires multiple configurations in several different
devices. This demands costly professional personnel and a considerable work effort.
In SDN, the solution would be similar, but it would require less effort. Since the
controller is centralized, switches’ ports can be controlled off and on from a sin-
gle point, and the connectivity status to all hosts can be followed. Furthermore,
the authorization of hosts can be provided by an application running over the con-
troller, which also authorizes switches when connecting to them (i.e. OpenFlow uses
TLS [41]).
VLAN join, tagging and hopping. Legacy Ethernet switches can listen and ad-
vertise its VLANs with VLAN management protocol messages from any of its ports.
This allows an attacker to make a host or a compromised switch to join all VLANs
and access the restricted segment of the network. Even if a switch can be configured
to not to advertise (its VLANs), the switch still listens to them and thus makes
possible for an attacker to join a VLAN by probing. Furthermore, with tagging and
hopping an attacker can access other VLANs. This is done by modifying packet
frames with specific MAC and IP addresses.
Nevertheless, with careful configurations of individual VLAN segmentation in the
network, using IEEE 802.1ad Q-in-Q double tagging [13], or by using vendor pro-
vided Private VLAN (PVLAN) technique [42] these vulnerabilities can be prevented.
These methods have still the impact of creating overhead in Ethernet frames, re-
ducing switching performance and restricting virtual mobility.
As for SDN, VLANs are not configurations created in switches, but they are soft-
ware defined in the controller and flows are created in the switches accordingly. As
a matter of fact, SDN removes the need to use VLANs as it is done traditionally.
Therefore with SDN, there are no VLAN threats as in legacy Ethernet. Addition-
ally, since programmability, SDN VLANs can be defined by port, IP, MAC, time, or
any other variable where a flow can be identified. Also the combination of variables
can be used, thus restricting the possibility of spoofing attacks.
Remote Access to the LAN. Using social engineering [43], one can access an
Ethernet segment through higher layers. By compromising a host inside the target
segment, the attacker can use the compromised host to access administrative ser-
vices and commence the attack further.
In this case, the vulnerability is created with social engineering (i.e. Phishing). To
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prevent them, the utilization of security services has to be conducted, such as fire-
walls, Spam filters, anti-virus, and anti-spy-ware software. Although, these services
are not airtight and can be bypassed as new vulnerabilities are discovered. Another
way is to educate users to be more cautious when using the Internet. It is worth to
mention that, this issue is out of Ethernet’s scope. As initially, the host has to have
an access to communicate with the network.
In principle, SDN can not provide more protection against social engineering, but
then, when a host is compromised, administrative access is not possible from a host
(unless access is separately granted, which is not the norm). The main target of SDN
is to isolate the control from the data flows, giving its host a transparent network.
Topology and Vulnerability Discovery. An attacker can send to a network mes-
sages to investigate the responses and to discover the topology and services provided
by the hosts. From simply listening to broadcast ARP requests, an attacker can find
out used host IP addresses, servers, and gateways where the hosts are connected to.
The IP range used can be also investigated from the DHCP replies. With these bits
of information, an attacker may scan throughout the network and reveal vulnerable
hosts, enabling the attacker to access and do further attacks.
Obviously, this threat presents two issues: broadcast messages and network scan-
ning. In legacy Ethernet, solutions are not directly provided to solve these issues
individually, and the solutions are higher layer (layers 3-5) oriented. Against net-
work scanning and intrusion there are solutions to prevent them such as firewalls,
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS). These
mechanisms are designated to detect and stop intrusions and unauthorized traffic.
A solution to remove broadcast messages from a network with SDN is presented in
Chapter 4. As it turns out, with SDN, it possible to remove broadcast messages
from a network without affecting the performance or functionality. For network
scanning, SDN presents again a way to overcome it. As presented in Section 2.4.1,
with FRESCO Reflector Net application, the network scanning attempt can be de-
tected, prevented, and redirected to a honeypot for further study. Additionally,
since the prevention was implemented in the controller with an application which
simply follows failed TCP connections, there is no need for costly IDS and IPS de-
vices. Hence, as SDN can make the whole network to function as a firewall, with
possibility of IPS and IDS capabilities, it shows that programmability brings many
benefits to customize the network to your own needs.
Break-Ins. When an attacker has the information of a vulnerability in a host, an
attack can be executed using Ethernet as a medium. Usually, this appears in the
target as a normal network session, thus the attack remains undetected. Here, as
with Topology and Vulnerability Discovery, a firewall, IDS, IPS can be used to pre-
vent some of the break-ins. Once the attacker has broken in to a system, it can not
be prevented from Ethernets’ scope anymore and thus it falls down to the computer
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security system, which is out of this thesis’s scope.
Generally, with SDN, host break-ins are also hard to detect. If an attacker has
found a host and its vulnerabilities, then it is likely that the flow created for the
attack was successful (i.e. the attack comes from a trusted source). In this situ-
ation, SDN has little to do since its main operations are on the lower layers (2 and 3).
Switch Control. When switches are newly installed, as default they are provided
with a default password (or none) for accessing the administrative tools and ser-
vices. If (1) the network administrator was careless and did not change the default
password, (2) the attacker gained the physical access to the switch and reset the
password with physical reset, (3) attacker gained the password by stealing, (4) or
found a vulnerability with the switch, an attacker can access and control the switch.
The attacker could reroute the traffic by shutting down links, by claiming STP
root, or by performing a Denial of Service (see Section 3.4) attack to selected links.
Nonetheless, a legacy Ethernet switches are generally limited by its hardware and OS
to only perform switching and flow control actions. While, performing eavesdrop-
ping or generating spoofed frames are usually not possible. Anyway, the attacker
can make a switch redirect or mirror its traffic to the attacker, which makes eaves-
dropping possible and also unauthorized VLAN access.
A switch is preferred to be placed in a secure and secret location. This way an
attacker can not perform a physical password reset, thus making switch control at-
tack harder. The administrative tools and services should always be kept behind
passwords, and preferably if it is possible, behind authentication services with certifi-
cates such as TLS, SSL, or anything similar. This way the intrusion into a switch is
limited and restricted, making an attacker harder to gain the control of the network.
In SDN, a switch is tightly connected with its controller. Without the controller, the
switch is dumb and thus can not act on any network. Nevertheless, a SDN support-
ing switch is protected with password in the same manner as the legacy switches.
The hardware of a SDN switch is more powerful than in a legacy switch, since han-
dling flow generation and matching packets requires more computation power. This
means that a SDN switch has more abilities to tamper traffic and get control of it.
Assuming that an attacker gained the control of an SDN switch, he could look up
the generated flow rules from the flow rule tables and save it for later usage and then
change the switch’s controller to the attackers’ own controller, which shall keep the
same flow rules available and mirror every traffic to the attacker for eavesdropping.
Obviously, the complete control of the network (switches) belongs to the attacker.
As in legacy Ethernet, the best advise is to isolate the hardware in a secure and
secret location. In SDN, it is recommended to isolate physically the control network
from the managed data network. Else, in the case of logical control traffic isolation,
the attacker could eavesdrop switches’ control traffic by passively listening to inter
switch links and in addition try to connect to the administration interface. Clearly,
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physical isolation is necessary for a secure SDN network. In addition, OpenFlow
provides means for a switch to authenticate to the controller and therefore provide
the assurance of a reliable switch. As for unauthorized administration access, a
possible solution could be a mechanism where the switch notifies the controller of
an access attempt providing the controller to act upon it.
An additional thereat to the survey [38] has to be discussed. As SDN differs not only
of its programmability, but also in its physical and design structure. The center node
of a SDN network is the controller, which brings one more threat to the network
and system access topic: Controller Control. The SDN controller is not currently
standardized and existing implementations vary in many levels. More importantly,
the controller is a network device, practically a computer, which possesses multiple
Network Interface Controllers (NIC) with multiple ports for efficient switch connec-
tivity. In case an attacker compromises the controller, the ultimate control of the
whole network managed by that controller is accessible. As critical as it sounds, this
calls for drastic measurement to protect this central orchestration unit. Since the
controller is a computer, it is highly recommended that security levels of accessing
this device is with the highest priority.
This is currently the weakest point of SDN. As there are alternative ways of imple-
menting a controller, one solution can be the distributed controller platform, such
as in Onix [1]. Similarly, the FlowVisor [44] presents a platform to have a controller
to multiple controllers.
3.2 Traffic Confidentiality
Since confidential messages and information are transmitted in the network, one
of the biggest interests of an attacker is to listen to the traffic (eavesdropping). In
legacy Ethernet network, a switch sends to a host its own traffic, broadcast messages,
and frames which are flooded at the time of the switch’s MAC table timeout [45]. In
addition, a switch floods frames in case of a unknown destination. This means, an
attacker can generate frames with random destinations to overwrite switch’s MAC
table and let the switch flood all frames, thus enabling eavesdropping.
In SDN, broadcast messages can be removed and random flooding does not happen
except if the controller has applied such a mechanism in the switch. By default, in
SDN, unknown traffic is directed to the controller for further processing. In the case
of the controller not knowing the recipient, the controller can flood out a broadcast
message to determine the location of the unknown host. On the contrary, if the
controller is implemented in the manner to keep track of all its connected hosts, this
situation never comes up. This is further elaborated in Chapter 4.
Another way to eavesdrop is to overwrite a MAC table entry by sending a frame
with a forged sender address. This case is illustrated in Figure 11. Even thought
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the attacker can gain targets identity, maintaining it can become challenging. As if
the target is on-line, there will be a race condition in the switch and eavesdropping
can be performed only randomly. Whereas, if the attacker has the knowledge that
the target is off-line, eavesdropping is possible.
Figure 11: An example of MAC spoofing, where the host 10.0.0.11 pretends to be
the host 10.0.0.10 by sending a frame with spoofed MAC address which updates the
switch’s MAC table.
In SDN, MAC spoofing would be similarly possible, but in the case of a race con-
dition, there is a possibility to create a policy to react to such cases. Although, an
authentication mechanism for the network access can restrict MAC spoofing possi-
bilities.
An efficient way to eavesdrop is to perform it passively. Passive eavesdropping is
performed between two host, two switches, or between a host and a switch. The at-
tacker attaches a listening device in the medium (i.e. cable) and collects everything
that goes through. Since there is no architectural change in the network, passive
eavesdropping is fairly hard to discover. This threat affects both SDN and legacy
the same way. Yet, a slight advantage in SDN is that it can prevent a switches
flooding any traffic and hence bypass passive eavesdropping.
3.3 Traffic Integrity
The integrity of the traffic is what the users rely on for genuine networking ex-
perience. An attacker, after gaining the control of traffic, can modify and imitate
reliable services and acquire confidential information from the host or the user. This
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is a threat both in SDN networks and in legacy networks.
ARP and DHCP Poisoning. Due to broadcast messages sent in DHCP and
ARP protocols, an attacker can acquire the advance to redirect hosts’ messages to
a fake gateway and DNS, and to capture traffic intended for someone else. The first
mentioned is called DHCP poisoning, where an attacker will race the DHCP server
to respond to a host’s requests for DHCP information (with a broadcast message).
The attacker tries to be the first replier and thus provide the confused host with
a fake gateway and DNS information. The attacker can then imitate real network
services and receive from the host confidential information. The latter advance is
called an ARP poisoning [46]. Due to the concept of ARP protocol, a host can listen
to ARP replies sent by others even if the listening host did not send a request for
it. Using this vulnerability, an attacker can simply send an ARP reply message to
a host with forged source IP (to represent some other host or service), and source
MAC address. In Figure 12, this case is illustrated.
Figure 12: An example of ARP spoofing, where the host 10.0.0.11 poisons host’s
10.0.0.10 ARP table.
Since DHCP poisoning is an attack performed with a race condition, it can be
difficult to detect it afterwards and recognizing a genuine DHCP server requires
prefabricated measurements from both sides (host and server). As for ARP poison-
ing, DHCP snooping and S-ARP [47] are possible solutions for prevention. With
snooping DHCP information of a network, the MAC and IP addresses can be tied
with the corresponding port on the switch. Whereas, S-ARP provides cryptographic
authentication measurements to identify hosts’ identities.
With SDN, as explained before (see Section 3.2), by removing broadcast messages,
the host can be secure from these threats. Although, ARP poisoning might be
possible if an attacker has access to the same Ethernet segment and know the IP
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and MAC addresses of the target host. A possible prevention of ARP poisoning
can be acquired with mechanism where the host is modified to accept only ARP
replies from a controller or the controller orders the switches to drop all ARP reply
messages from an unauthorized sender.
Man in the Middle (MITM). Using ARP or DHCP poisoning, an attacker can
perform MITM attacks. The attacker needs to either poison two hosts ARP table
to direct the traffic intended between the host through the attacker, or imitate a
DHCP server to create a scenario where the attacker is a proxy (hidden from the
host) between the host and the real network. MITM attacks are mainly to per-
formed for eavesdropping or to for tampering and modifying traffic. ARP or DHCP
poisoning can be contained the same way as mentioned before.
Another way to perform MITM attacks. As seen from Figure 13, by connecting
two switches which are in the same network to the attackers’ switch, it will create a
loop. As LAN’s are tree topologies, loops are prevented by STP and as the attackers
switch claims to have the highest priority, the attackers’ switch can claim the root
position. This way the attacker can eavesdrop or modify traffic which flows through
the root switch.
Figure 13: An example of Man in the Middle attack, where the attacker captures
STP root and divides the network into two splits where the the traffic flow through.
STP uses Bridge Protocol Data Unit (BPDU) messages to select root. Therefore,
to prevent STP root attack, a BPDU or root guard can be implemented. A BDPU
guard blocks all STP messages from a designated port. This way network adminis-
trators can reserve the ports to be used by inter-switch connections and use BDPU
guard on the other ports. Another tool is called STP root guard, which allows STP
messages from a port but prevents claiming root. [48]
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In SDN, the controller has the topology knowledge and hence STP is not needed.
The controller can decide the best route for each individual flow according to desired
requirements. This leaves SDN out of scope for MITM attacks with STP. Never-
theless, MITM attacks with passive eavesdropping is still possible in SDN networks,
as explained previously (see Section 3.2). If the network contains legacy segments,
guard functionality can be supported by allowing the BPDU messaging in the flow
rules.
Session Hijacking and Replay. Many higher layer protocols create sessions to
handle their communication services. If an attacker has a possibility to do a MITM
attack and eavesdrop the traffic, the attacker can collect information about the ses-
sions and thus recreate it or hijack it. The attacker can then pretend to be one of the
endpoints and use the service disguised as the other endpoint. To quiet down the
pretended endpoint, the attacker can simply execute a Denial of Service attack (see
Section 3.4) or divert the traffic. A session hijacking attack can be used to break
in to a service which requires initial authentication but no further verification [49].
An authenticated session can be recreated if an attacker gained packets which are
used for initial authentication. This is called the Replay attack. Even though the
packets might be encrypted, the attack does not require more than the knowledge
(or a guess) of the content, and the attacker can reuse it without altering it.
As sessions are created in the higher layers, these attacks can not be prevented on the
Ethernet layer more than a MITM attack. To prevent session hijacking and replay
attacks, higher layer protection services have to be used. Services which promotes
encrypted connections and timestamps (such as MACsec [50], SSH [51], or TLS [41]).
In SDN, these attacks can not be directly addressed. As the session is created, it is
assumed trustful from the lower layer connection, thus leaving it to higher layers to
take care of the authenticity. Although a SDN application could be created to fol-
low up sessions, triggered and terminated by the host. This solution would require
host to controller connectivity, ergo attention is needed for protecting other arisen
threats against the solution. Generally, as in this threat it is assumed that MITM
attack has succeeded, SDN has evenly a little role to stop the attack as the Ethernet
has.
3.4 Denial of Service
For disrupting traffic or networking performance, an attacker can perform a Denial
of Service (DoS) attack. It can be performed either to suspend or interfere with a
service. At the hardware level, a DoS attack can be performed by cutting a cable
or by harming a network equipment(such as a switch). However, a DoS attack in
layer 2 can be more damaging and structured [38].
Resource Exhaustion Attacks. When a switch makes forwarding lookups and
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forwards traffic, it requires from the hardware computing power and resource al-
location. The switch’s management and control traffic requires some additional
processing and handling, especially when the configuration is being changed. Since
hardware has its limitations, it is possible that the switch might get over exhausted
when performing many additional computations requiring tasks. Also, the nature
of the incoming traffic to the switch, has a big impact on how much it enervates
the switch. Additionally, a switch might be set to process a certain type of data
plane traffic (e.g. for logging purposes), making it vulnerable to exhaustion attacks
(overloading). This can occur, if the attacker knows (or guesses) the switch config-
uration and starts to overload the switch by flooding a particular kind of traffic to
the switch. When a switch gets overloaded, the performance to process decreases
and the traffic gets slower or it stops.
Initially, Ethernet has not addressed this attack directly, in SDN a resource exhaus-
tion attack can be controlled with decreasing traffic on a certain node or blocking
misbehaving port completely. Since the management and control are decoupled in
SDN the computation is outsourced and switches have only behavior instructions
regarding the traffic. Nevertheless, a switch can be overloaded if the switch is set to
process certain frames (OpenFlow operation set) before forwarding them. Ergo, by
limiting the traffic (by dropping packets or closing the port), or by redirecting the
traffic through other path, resource exhaustion attack can be controlled.
Protocol Based DoS. In legacy Ethernet, the network topology is physically a
mesh figured network. With STP, the topology is transformed logically in to a tree
topology. As explained in MITM attack (see Section 3.3), an attacker can add a fake
switch to the network and disrupt the whole network by flooding useless traffic [52].
Since STP is not used in SDN in the same manner as in the legacy Ethernet LAN,
SDN falls out of scope for this threat. Furthermore, the concept of SDN leaves the
network functionalities completely to the controller and its applications. Thus, SDN
networks can be built completely from the scratch, discarding all existing protocols.
The network functionalities can be designed specifically to satisfy a specific type
of network (LAN). In this sense, DoS attacks which are performed by misusing a
specific protocol’s vulnerability, can be completely disregard in SDN networks. It
does not mean that SDN prevents DoS attacks, but it makes them certainly different.
3.5 System security
Building complex networks requires careful design of configurations. For every net-
work device, precautions have to be taken against security threats while preserving
network functionalities. To enable certain functionalities, the right configurations
and hardware installations are in a network device essential. Configuration and
Installation Issues may arise, as humans occasionally tend to make mistakes. An
attacker can misuse or exploit network vulnerabilities in case of gaining the infor-
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mation about a configuration or installation mistakes.
In legacy Ethernet network, every switch needs a separate installation and configu-
ration procedures. Thus, making it essential to carefully prefabricate configurations
and professional dependable installation. On the contrary, SDN requires only careful
hardware installation and a simple configuration (e.g. locating controller). The rest
configurations are done by the controller, hence, configuration mistakes are simpler
to repair.
Implementation Issues and Vendor Extensions. As Ethernet control and man-
agement are not defined in detail, it leaves room for implementation. For example,
vendors use this freedom to provide own proprietary solutions and services. New
implementations often have undiscovered weaknesses or issues and thus provides an
attacker with the possibility to find them.
Although, in SDN the control and management configurations are not implemented
in switches, they still are still at risk of being exploited. Nevertheless, as these
exploits are discovered, it is much easier to repair and improve them, as the im-
plementations are in the controller. Vendors can easily update their software by
updating the SDN application.
In the paper [38], two additional issues were defined regarding system security: is-
sues with Legacy Technology and Architectural Issues. These issues are both
out of SDN’s scope to solve. The issues are reflecting upon the Ethernet’s extensibil-
ity (e.g. with software and equipment) and its relationship to upper layer protocols
which assume Ethernet is protected. Usually, protocols and communication tech-
nologies are embedded with security mechanism which requires implementation on
both ends of communication, relying on the middle ware to be secure.
3.6 Summary
In summary, SDN can overcome many Ethernet security issues, yet undiscovered
SDN vulnerabilities bring new threats to the network. Nevertheless, the advantage
of SDN is that the network is centralized. Thus, managing the traffic and the secu-
rity of the network is done efficiently from a single point. As opposed to the legacy
Ethernet networks, where the management is distributed and hence require more
complex solutions.
Due to the architectural aspect of how SDN networks are constructed, protocols such
as STP and VLAN can be completely discarded, and hence their security issues are
not anymore relevant. Even the issues troubling host connectivity protocols, such
as ARP, can be surpassed. A SDN network is aware of the status of the network
structure and of its passing traffic. This helps improving the network security while
preventing traditional methods to of attacks. It is noteworthy to mention that the
SDN suffers of a single point failure issue. Meaning if, the controller or a SDN appli-
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cation is compromised, the whole network is under the control of the unauthorized
party.
Each issue concerning Ethernet was briefly discussed, and compared if SDN is con-
cerned with the same issue. Generally, by adding authentication, encrypting the
traffic, and securing device premises, network security is can be enhanced signifi-
cantly. Yet, the issues which come with networking protocols, have to be addressed
separately.
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4 Example Implementation: Broadcast Remover
In this section, an example SDN implementation is introduced. The aim of the im-
plementation is to increase the status of Ethernet LAN’s security with SDN provided
capabilities. The section will start by defining the goals of the implementation along
with the issues which it is going to address. Continued, by describing the design and
the architecture of the implementation. Following by a comparison with the existing
SDN security enhancing solutions presented in Section 2.4. Finally, the implemen-
tation will be evaluated concentrating on the possible focus points for further work.
It is worth to mention that this implementation, is only theoretical and it requires
extensive testing and benchmarking.
4.1 Goals
The implementation represents a SDN solution to improving legacy Ethernet LAN
security. The solution aims to tackle known broadcasting issues which are IPv4
based protocols such as ARP and DHCP, IPv6 is excluded from the design. The
target is to implement an application (called Broadcast Remover) and design it
to run on a controller which controls a set of switches in a LAN. The goal is to
implement Broadcast Remover from multiple modules where each module has its
responsibility. For instance, one of the modules will handle the authentication of
the hosts connected to the network and another module will manage the broadcast
messages.
Additionally, another aim of Broadcast Remover is to be backwards compatible.
Meaning, that connecting hosts (users) do not have to change any of their hardware
or add new additional software. The host communication with other hosts will be
as transparent as in the legacy but only more secure.
As seen in the previous Section 3, the legacy Ethernet LAN has multiple security
issues which need critical attention. In the section, every issue was provided with a
brief discussion whether SDN can offer a solution or not. At this point, a solution
will be provided with a practical SDN environment design. The target is to utilize
SDN properties to improve Ethernet LAN’s security.
4.2 Broadcast, the threat?
As the name of the solution indicates, the main target of the Broadcast Remover is
to address mainly the threats that come along with Ethernet’s broadcast messag-
ing feature. Additionally, it aims to tackle the switch’s over exhaustion DoS threat
and eavesdropping possibilities to switch’s flood traffic (see more about DoS in Sec-
tion 3.4 and about eavesdropping to switch’s flood traffic in the Section 3.2).
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However, the broadcast messages have their initial purposes, and therefore, the
Broadcast Remover will not essentially remove broadcast functionality, but it will
change those broadcast messages which unnecessarily expose host’s identity to more
secure alternative. The purpose is not to decrease the networks functionality but
to increase its immunity and security to external menace. Hence, the purposes of
using broadcast messaging has to be investigated to see whether the same function-
ality can be provided likewise utilizing SDN properties. In principle, the purpose of
broadcast messaging can be divided in to three types: (1) to locate a host in the
network (i.e. ARP), (2) to provide a service (i.e. printer), and (3) for personal use.
For the first type, the possible security threads were discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.3.
Protocols such as ARP and DHCP use broadcast messages to find hosts and available
services in an Ethernet LAN. The principle being that a request is always answered
regardless of the requester, also, a broadcast message is always received despite the
sender. In other words, anyone can detect hosts in the network by probing different
IP addresses. Also, using ARP and DHCP poisoning, an attacker can perform Man
in the Middle attack and hence eavesdrop passing traffic. ARP poisoning is an at-
tack where the attacker alters the victim host’s ARP table and the DHCP poisoning
is where the attacker races the DHCP server to respond a host’s request for DHCP
server information.
The solution for the first type is to transform the broadcast messages into unicast
messages. Originally, in legacy Ethernet LAN the host’s location and hardware
identity was not necessarily known by any part of the network, hence, by sending a
broadcast message to all connected devices and trusting their honesty, hosts could
find each other without a problem. However, now in SDN it is possible to recognize
each connected device in the network and redirect the traffic directly to its destina-
tion without the need for locating the host.
As for the second type, a service which uses broadcasting is usually designed to be
known by everyone connected in the network. Therefore, Broadcast Remover will
allow these kind of messages to be broadcasted. Obviously, a white list of allowed
hosts for broadcasting has to be implemented. Additionally, to protect the misuse of
spoofing, only the identified host are allowed to broadcast. For example, by allowing
only a certain host from a certain port with known identity (such as MAC address)
to broadcast.
The third type is a type of a protocol which uses broadcasting for its own reasons.
These types of usage have the same position as the second type, a white list imple-
mentation.
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4.3 Authentication possibilities
The implementation will manage the connected hosts by authentication. Authen-
tication is not a requirement for operation but it has a great impact on increasing
security. As authentication aggravates the difficulty of a host identity spoofing, it
improves additionally the integrity of the traffic.
As for authentication possibilities, there are two; (1) MAC address based, and (2)
Web server based. The first has the advantage of simplicity in implementation, as
the second is more secure and reliable. The MAC based authentication depends on
a white list of allowed MAC addresses to communicate in the network. A module
responsible for authentication can either keep updated flow rules in the switches
for each host or create the flow rules when a host appears. The latter is more dy-
namical as the size of the flow rule tables in the switches are limited. Although,
creating flow rules on demand requires more responsibility from the module to rec-
ognize the host when it connects to the network. However, the web server based
is implemented with allowing traffic initially only between the authentication web
server and the host. The web server will provide an authentication interface re-
quiring host’s identification. After successful identification, the web server notifies
the module responsible for authentication to create flow rules for the connected host.
4.4 Design and Architecture
Broadcast Remover is designed according to the SDN principle: a network of switches
which support OpenFlow, the controller which controls the switches while provid-
ing information and a managing interface for the applications, and the applications
which handle the tasks related to the network. In the Broadcast Remover, the tasks
are divided into logical ensembles which are indicated as modules. The Figure 14
illustrates the design of the implementation.
The applications of the Broadcast Remover can be implemented in several differ-
ent ways: (1) one application which runs on the controller and where each of the
module is implemented as a separate function, (2) each module implemented as its
own application, or (3) a combination of modules in several applications. In the
first case the simplicity of the inter-module interaction becomes as an advantage. In
other cases, the controller has to provide an interface for interconnectivity between
the applications. Nonetheless, multi-application solution can be easier to manage as
a failure in one of the applications does not necessarily stop the other applications.
The purpose and responsibilities of each module are described in following subsec-
tions.
The controller of the Broadcast Remover represents a basic SDN controller as de-
scribed in Section 2.1. Only depending on how the application layer is implemented,
the controller may have to provide an inter-application communication interface.
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Figure 14: The design of the Broadcast Remover. The Network Manager module (see
Section 4.4.1) might not be needed if the controller provides it. The DoS Preventer
module (see Section 4.4.5) adds optional security and therefore not required for
implementation.
Additionally, the controller can offer the construction of the network topology pro-
vided with the reliability of the switch identity. Optionally, if this is not provided
by the controller it can be implemented as one of the applications or its modules.
As for the switches, the connection between the controller and the switches has to
be secured both physically and logically. Meaning that the wiring and devices are
located in secure domains and they use TLS to encrypt the management communi-
cation between the switches and the controller.
When a switch picks up traffic which did not match any flow rules, the switch can
send the unidentified frames to the controller, which should trigger the controller
to generate new flow rules concerning the unidentified traffic. The switch can al-
ternatively just drop unidentified traffic and allow only the traffic specified by the
controller. Both ways are possible, yet they differ in the way of handling new con-
nections and traffic. To examine which way is more convenient, the process where
a new host appears has to be studied.
Now, as a host connects to the network, the identity is unknown before the host
communicates. Hence, it is possible that the connected host is vicious (e.g. passive
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listener, misbehaving host) and therefore the traffic from the host must be filtered
and allow only a certain type of traffic to initially verify its identity before more
privileges is given. Alternatively, problems may arise if all traffic is directed towards
the controller, such as the threat of a DoS attack.
One possible solution of a switch sending unidentified traffic to the controller would
be that only the first frame is sent to the controller and the switch drops everything
else. If the traffic comes from a trusted source, the controller should either react
or not respond. This now requires that the first frame sent from the host should
have at least the host’s MAC address to be able to verify the host. To minimize
spoofing attempts, the switch will allow only one frame per physical port connection
per connection session, contrary to one frame per a MAC address.
Another solution of a switch having predefined flow rules would be to modify manu-
ally permissions for the statically identified hosts, while everything else is dropped,
expect the DHCP request (for host identity check). Clearly, this way the network
favors non-statically defined hosts, yet it can be very inefficient if the network has
many statically identified hosts. Anyway, Broadcast Remover will take this solution
as a default behavior at all the switches, as it is simpler to implement and it is less
vulnerable to unidentified traffic. This also ensures that initially the network is not
available for any kind of traffic until the controller permits it. This is considered as
a security benefit while it prevents for example the passive eavesdropping when it is
done by directly connecting to the network (see more about passive eavesdropping
in Section 3.2).
The hosts will connect to the switches and they do not require any modification in
their existing networking behavior. As a host connects to the network, it connects
and performs connectivity procedures the same way as in a legacy Ethernet network.
4.4.1 Module: Network Topology Manager
The network consists of switches with OpenFlow support. Using OpenFlow, switches
provide an interface to control them. Hence, the switches are recommended to be
connected to the controller securely, so authentication can be used for reliability to
have a trusted controller for the switches and vice versa. This way, the controller can
generate a list of connected switches and provide an interface for the applications
to communicate with them.
The Network Topology Manager module will collect periodically the list of the con-
nected switches from the controller and it will requests every switch to provide its
current connectivity information (port status). The module will then probe each
port of each switch to see which ports are connected to another switch and con-
struct the network topology accordingly. When there are changes in the network
topology, the module updates its information. The switch probing can be done using
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Link Layer Discovery Protocol (IEEE802.1ab LLDP [53]). As LLDP is a standard
and used also by legacy switches, the switches which are not OpenFlow supported
may respond to the probe but they are not included in the network. For security
reasons these port should be blocked as they present a possibility to perform MITM
attack (explained in Section 3.3). The network should consist only of OpenFlow
supported devices which are connected to the controller securely. In case needed,
the module can support manual addition by the network administrator.
The module then provides other modules the list of connected switches and their
port statuses along with the topology information. Using these information, the
other modules can give flow rules directly to a precise switch and route traffic.
This module should be in principle included in the controller as the network topol-
ogy is commonly needed for many purposes. In case the controller has a topology
discovery functionality provided with security mechanism needed, then this module
becomes obsolete. Nevertheless this module is the first module to be initiated to
make network functional.
4.4.2 Module: Host Manager
The task of this module is to provide hosts with an IP address, authenticate uniden-
tified hosts, and to keep module’s database updated. It cooperates with Broadcast
Manager (Section 4.4.3) and End-to-end Router (see Section 4.4.4) modules in the
case of host detection or flow rule creation. The Host Manager module maintains a
database which consists of both connected and disconnected hosts in the network.
Additionally, the module provides an interface for other modules to have access to
the database. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of this module’s to provide the
authentication measurements according to the security level choices, either with a
white list of allowed MAC addresses or with an authentication Web server.
As a host connects to the network, typically, an IP address for IP communication
is required. The host either requests it from a DHCP server or it is spontaneously
defined by the user or a stateless auto-configuration [54]. Primarily, the connection
starts out on the physical level. The switch is able to recognize on the connected in-
terface that a connection on the physical level is established, but on the link level the
connection is not made before the host transmits any traffic indicating its identity.
Usually, it is a broadcast message to prevent identity conflicts (i.e. ARP announce-
ment [54]) or to locate a DHCP server with a DHCPDISCOVER message [16]. In
either way, all broadcast messages are handled by the Broadcast Manager module
(see Section 4.4.3), which triggers then this module in the case of an IP address
request. This module will then perform as a DHCP server and answers to the host
accordingly.
Host’s which have defined spontaneously its own IP address can not use the network
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unless the administration has added the host manually in the module’s database.
The administrator needs to provide the IP and MAC addresses, and additionally
the port location where the host will connect. Also, multiple connection points can
be defined to assure the mobility of the host. The module generates then flow rules
for the switches where these hosts can appear to enable communication for the host
(such as host-gateway for Internet connection). According to the need, End-to-end
Router module can be triggered to enable intra-network communication. Nonethe-
less, these manual additions are compromising the security of the network, as an
attacker can spoof the identity of these hosts and misuse the communication. Prov-
ing the identity of an host is without authentication almost impossible. Hence, the
web based authentication can offer the reassurance of the identity of the host.
In the case of a host which is connected to the network but no traffic can be detected
from its interface, can be in the worst case a passive listener trying to sniff the traf-
fic. This threat is void as the initial state of the switches is not to push any traffic
out of any port before the controller allows it. Alternatively, an authenticated host
which has privileges to communicate can be disconnected while in the same port a
spoofed host is reconnected with the same identity (MAC address) as the privileged
one. This is a major MAC spoofing threat (see Section 3.2) which can be prevented
if web based authentication is used. With web based authentication, every discon-
nection requires re-authentication, hence limiting spoofing possibilities. Although it
might generate some frustration on the user side in case of accidental disconnection,
but the security benefit makes it worth it.
As discussed earlier, the authentication can be implemented in two ways, either
web based or MAC address based. In the case of MAC address authentication, the
module holds a white list of allowed MAC addresses which will be allowed to com-
municate. The authentication happens automatically during IP address request as
the IP address is only given to those in the list. Others who request an IP address
will be banned by creating a flow rule to drop everything which comes from the port
with its MAC address. This is clearly the less secure way to implement authentica-
tion as spoofing a MAC address is fairly simple. Also, a DoS attack to over exhaust
the system or searching allowed MAC addresses is possible. With probing different
MAC addresses the system will eventually allow a MAC address found in the list
or keep banning every not allowed MAC address, which would exhaust the system.
Nevertheless, to prevent over exhaustion, an attempt counter can be implemented.
Here the module registers the port where the authentication request was issued and
calculate the frequency of authentication requests per port. After a threshold, the
module can quite down the port for a predefined time. This task of preventing the
threat of DoS can be outsourced to be handled by the DoS Preventer module (see
Section 4.4.5), but for simplifying purposes it might be more efficient to implement
it directly into this module. Moreover, if the host has its own IP address already
defined, this authentication method becomes obsolete. To increase secureness, the
web based authentication method is recommended.
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The procedure of authentication with the web based differs. After the host has
gained an IP address, the module will first trigger End-to-end Router module (see
Section 4.4.4) to create flow rules for the host to allow only frames from the port
at the switch where the host is connected with the host’s MAC and IP addresses
to communicate with the authentication web server at protocol port 80 (HTTP).
The same procedure is done to the hosts with predefined IP addresses. Any other
traffic is set to be dropped. Now the only action what the host can perform is
to authenticate with predefined user identification such as a login and a password.
Security threats in this case are not too obvious. Spoofing is only possible if the
identification is stolen in addition to the MAC address. If irrelevant traffic is sent
extensively, it might over exhaust the switch. Nevertheless, the avoidance of this
threat is handled by the DoS Preventer module (see Section 4.4.5).
Regardless of which authentication method is implemented, upon successful authen-
tication, the module will trigger End-to-end Router module to create the flow rules
to serve the hosts needs or privileges, according to the configuration choices (will be
discussed more at Section 4.4.4).
At this stage, an additional host behavior situation must be considered: the chang-
ing of physical location in the network. As it was discussed, with every reconnection
a re-authentication is required, regardless of the location in the network. Hence, if
a duplicate host is detected, it might have two possible reasons: (1) the host has
moved and the database has not been updated of its disconnection, or it is (2) a
spoofing attempt. Regardless of the reason, a check up upon the original host has to
be made. A sufficient way to check would be to see the state of the port where the
host was previously connected. If the connection is still active, the connection dura-
tion meter is read to verify if the connection is older than the time of the last update
in the database entry. Generally, the database should be as accurate as possible and
the delay of updates as short as possible. Obviously, when the original host is found
then the duplicate must be a spoofing host. If the host is no more connected in
the original location, then the new connection can be accepted. Again, it might be
a spoofing attempt, which can be hindered with the web based authentication, yet
one more option is available to verify the reality of the situation. In the case where
the new location is far from the initial location, it is assumable that the transition
between the location can take time. Hence, an additional feature of a transition
delay meter for port changing could prevent spoofing attempts made too hastily.
The database of the module contains the information of the connected hosts and if
demanded a list of allowed and banned hosts. This database can be used for moni-
toring and managing. It has potential to be used in extended modules which are not
presented in Broadcast Remover. The database is accurate in respect of the host
addition as it is linear, yet the hosts which are leaving must be triggered externally.
The module can perform periodically a check up upon all the switches and their
port statuses in addition to the connection duration meter readings. Additionally,
an OpenFlow switch can be configured to notify the controller upon port status
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changes. The module can either poll the controller or the controller is set to trigger
a database update function which will refresh the database entries. A downside with
this can be a misuse or a malfunction of the physical connection, as every time the
interface goes up or down it triggers the procedure which can eventually exhaust
the system. A simple solution for this can be a counter to each port status changes.
When the counter reaches a threshold, the administrator can be notified of a failure
and the switch reconfigured to shut down the misbehaving interface.
It is also notable that this implementation requires that a host should have only one
identity (MAC address) per port (the switch interface) per connection (on the phys-
ical layer). Inevitably, the restriction of single identity per port serves for the cause
of preventing unauthorized network extensions. As discussed in Section 3.1, one of
the vulnerabilities of the legacy LAN is its extensibility with additional switches.
Simply by connecting a switch or a WLAN router to the network can add additional
access points. Although, expanding the network with a NAT featured network de-
vice could hide unauthorized access to the network. The issue is a known downside,
as detecting NAT devices can be complicated, yet not impossible. The module can
be extended to support such a feature, either by implementing an existing solution,
such as sFlow [55] or by creating an interface for a third party product. Neverthe-
less, in case of such an event, the right procedure is to ban the port (the switch
interface) by silencing the port and additionally notify the administration.
Table 2: The suggested structure format of the Host Management module’s
database.
# MAC
ad-
dress
IP
ad-
dress
Auth
status
Last seen
switch(port)
time
connection
start time
Additional info
1 AA:BB 10.2.1 true sw12(22)
15:12.44
15.04.2014
10:23.33
01.01.2014
Example of authenti-
cated host
2 BB:CC 10.2.2 false sw03(04)
09:11.10
16.04.2014
23:22.13
02.03.2014
Example of unauthen-
ticated host
3 CC:DD N/A false sw10(15)
00:01.55
18.04.1986
N/A Example of unidenti-
fied host
The database is structured as a list (see Table 2), where each row resembles a
host and its networking status. Each host’s information and status is stored to its
respected column. Each host (row) should have at least the entries on its MAC
address, the location of the interface connected, time of the initial connection, and
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last seen packet transmission. Additionally information on each host’s networking
status is essential for check up and monitoring measurements, such as authentication
status. In case of web based authentication, IP address becomes obligatory as the
host gains an IP address before authentication. Each host on the list is a connected
host. When a host disconnects it can be either removed or saved on a separate list.
Having information of old connections is useful for logging and additional feature
measurements. One example could be the use of port changing monitoring.
4.4.3 Module: Broadcast Manager
As the implementation’s name indicates, this module plays the biggest role of pre-
venting the major Ethernet LAN thread, the broadcasting messaging. As discussed
earlier, the functionality of broadcasting can be useful and efficient, hence, removing
the functionality would not be a solution. The solution this implementation thrives
is to have more control over the broadcast messages and to handle them according
to the need.
This module’s task is to address all broadcast messages sent in the network. Accord-
ing to the situation, the module either prevents, allows, or modifies the broadcast
attempt. Each broadcast message situation needs special attention to achieve the
original functionality. At the switch, a broadcast frame can be recognized from its
destination address (255.255.255.255 in IPv4). The purpose of the message can be
separated into three different categories: (1) host management, (2) service advertise-
ment, and (3) private usage. As a host sends out a broadcast message, the controller
(the module) needs to identify the initial purpose of the message. To do this, the
Broadcast Manager module can be implemented in two ways: (1) upon each broad-
cast message the switch sends it to the controller to get further instructions, or (2)
the module generates rules for foreknown broadcast message types and situations,
and when the switch receives a broadcast message which does not match any given
rules it drops it. Inevitably, the second way is more efficient as it decreases the
traffic amount at the controller.
Anyway, regardless of the broadcast situation, the initial rule is to drop all broadcast
messages except those which matches one of the defined rules. Broadcast messages
sent in the first category are related with host management. Specifically, ARP
and DHCP messages. A switch can recognize an ARP message from the Ethernet
frame’s type field. Additionally, as there are several types of ARP messages, the
only type supported by the implementation is the ARP request. Other types are
ARP probe [56], ARP announcement [54], reverse ARP [57], and inverse ARP [58].
To distinguish between these types at the switch, the flow rule which accepts only
ARP requests has to be defined. By examining the ARP packets fields, the switch
can detect that: ARP probe has the sender IP address field set to zero, ARP an-
nouncement has the sender IP address equal to target IP address and the sender
MAC address equal to target MAC address, reverse ARP has the opcode set to
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number 3, and inverse ARP has the opcode set 8 or 9. Hence, to drop all unsup-
ported ARP messages, the module sets flow rules to the switches to do the following
comparisons: Ethernet type is 0x0806 (ARP [17]); ARP opcode is 1 (request); ARP
sender MAC address is equal to the Ethernet frame sender MAC and is non zero
and is not equal to the target MAC. This way only an ARP requests are sent to the
controller (captured by the Broadcast Manager module). Similarly, DHCP message
can be recognized from the Ethernets frame’s type field to be 0x0806 (IPv4), and
from IP packet the protocol is set to 17 (UDP [59]) with destination port 68 [16].
When such a message is recognized, it is sent to the controller to be further dealt
with.
Now, as the controller receives an broadcast message sent from a switch, the Broad-
cast Manager module captures it. If the message is an ARP message, the module
looks up from the Host Management module’s database the MAC address of re-
quested IP address and generates accordingly an ARP response message and sends
it to the requesting host. Here it is trusted that the database is updated and reliable.
Additionally, the module could request a database update either from the Host Man-
agement module or from the controller, but it can exhaust the controller if an update
is frequently requested. Hence, relying on the Host Management module might be
sufficient enough. However, if the captured message is a DHCP message it is sent
to Host Manager module (see Section 4.4.2) who will then serve the host accordingly.
As for broadcast messages which belong to the second category, these are predefined
broadcast messages, which purpose is to advertise its service through broadcasting
throughout the network (i.e. network printer or network access storage). These
hosts are manually added by the administrator to the Broadcast Manager mod-
ule’s allowed-broadcast list and when the host appears in the Host Management’s
modules database, the Broadcast Manager triggers End-to-end Router module (see
Section 4.4.4) to create flow rules for the broadcasting host to be able to reach all
connected other hosts in the network. Alternatively, if the broadcasting host can
not authenticate, such as a printer, then the authentication value is manually set to
true. Now to prevent spoofing attempts, upon each disconnection the value will be
overwritten to false. This may cause frustration as the service is unavailable until
the administrator enables it again. Hereupon, it is important to recognize the cause
of disconnection and act against it.
Moreover, a periodical check of the connected host in the database must be applied
in order to recognize whether new hosts have appeared, which either have broadcast-
ing privileges or they can be included to receive broadcast messages. Other way to
implement this is to make the Host Management module trigger the Broadcast Man-
ager module after a host has authenticated. Additionally, a broadcast-to-multicast
feature could be applied where the administrator can define a group of hosts which
are allowed to receive broadcast messages from a host. Regardless, the broadcast
privilege is set in a manner that only with the identity of the allowed host from a
specific network location (port) is allowed to broadcast, hence minimizing connec-
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tion misusing possibilities. Additionally, each host in the allowed-broadcast list has
to have the flow rule configurations to specify which type of broadcast messages are
allowed.
Lastly, the broadcast messages which belong to the third category are quite similar as
to the second category. Both of these need to be manually configured. The purpose
of these broadcast messages is a private manner, meaning that the implementation
network can support any additional types of broadcasting attempts, but it requires
a manual addition from the administrator and it can have more parameters to be
configured such as the flow rule renewal interval, and allowed ports for broadcasting
and listening. It is important that these broadcast features are configured carefully
not to enable contradicting rules in the switch. After the configurations are enabled
the module triggers End-to-end Router module to create and set the flow rules to
the switches.
4.4.4 Module: End-to-end Router
The main task of the End-to-end Router module is to create flow rules at the switches
in the network to enable communication between hosts. It is mainly used as a tool
by the other modules to enable the desired communication paths between hosts. By
default the module selects the shortest path between hosts, utilizing the network
topology (provided by the Network Topology Manager module, see Section 4.4.1).
The path is selected by calculating the distances using an algorithm, such as the
Dijkstra’s algorithm [60], or the Bellman-Ford algorithm [61], which are commonly
used routing algorithms. The implementation does not have any requirements re-
garding the algorithm as the network is rather statical. Alternatively, if congestion
avoidance is needed, a third party application can be used such as Plug-n-Serve [62]
to select the paths.
For creating routes, the module needs the source host, the destination host, and the
type of traffic which will be allowed. Therefore, when this module is triggered by the
Host Management module to enable traffic between the host and web authentication
server, the Host management module will have specify that only IP based traffic,
with TCP and as destination port 80 is allowed towards the web server. Also, when
the authentication was successful, the routes to the gateway and possibly other hosts
in the network, the type of traffic which is allowed between the hosts and towards
the gateway. The communication between the hosts is not a necessity, but it is an
optional feature if it is known by the administrator that these hosts need to be ini-
tially connected. Otherwise, the communication between hosts is established when
the Broadcast Manager module triggers this module upon a successful ARP request.
Also, for broadcasting hosts to reach other hosts in the network, the Broadcast Man-
ager module defines the source host along with destination hosts.
The established flow rules are valid for a predefined time. OpenFlow defines for
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each flow rule two timeouts. A hard timeout for the maximum amount of time the
flow rule is valid and an idle timeout for the maximum amount of time the rule is
allowed to be idle. When one of these timeouts go on, the flow rule is deleted. The
duration is recommended to be short to avoid expired flow rules allowing traffic in
the network. Hence, periodically after the hard timeout, this module should check
whether the host’s connection is still active from the Host Management module’s
database. If the host is still connected, then the flow rule is renewed. Another way
to manage the flow rules is to set the timeout to zero which means that the rules are
permanent and when the host disconnects the rule is removed. This way might be
more convenient as the selection of the optimal timeouts value can be difficult. Yet
the recognizing the disconnected host in real time can be tricky. Either this module
periodically checks the status from the Host Management module’s data base or the
Host Management notifies this module that a host is down and its flow rules should
be deleted.
4.4.5 Module: DoS Preventer
This module is optional for Broadcast Remover. Its task is to increase secureness
by preventing possible DoS attacks aimed at the network (see Section 3.4). At the
switch, the traffic which satisfies a flow rule is considered generally harmless, yet
in certain cases where the flow rule is set for the host management purposes, an
extensive amount of traffic can have a harmful intention behind it. Specifically, as
the host is allowed to request an IP address from the controller (managed by the
Host Management module, Section 4.4.2), theoretically only one request is sufficient
or in case of occasional packet loss some reattempts. However, if the host sends
requests constantly, it can be considered as an attempt of a DoS attack. Other such
cases are when the web based authentication is used and the host tries constantly
multiple times to authenticate, or during ARP request the host sends constantly
multiple ARP requests.
These attempts can be handled by quieting down the port for a predefined time. At
the switch, each flow rule has a counter indicating the amount of times the flow rule
was successfully matched. When this counter reaches a certain threshold, the mod-
ule sends the switch a quite port command which prevents the port from interacting
while keeping it connected. The previously mentioned cases need a threshold to be
set and a period of time the port should be quite. This module then periodically
checks the counters and acts when the thresholds have been exceeded.
Similarly, if the host sends constantly traffic which does not match any flow rule, it
can be considered as an attempt of a DoS attack. Hence, not to ban every acciden-
tal traffic of a host, a threshold of a certain amount traffic from a host should be
defined. The switches have also counters for traffic which did not match any flow
rule, and these are also inspected during the periodical check.
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4.5 Comparison with Existing Solutions
The Broadcast Remover is an implementation which particularly tries to prevent
the thread of the broadcast messaging as explained earlier. Additionally other se-
curity measures were addressed, yet other than that is unadressed. Therefore, as
presented in the Section 2.4, there are several SDN implementations which intent to
increase the secureness of the network. Briefly, FRESCO (which at the time of writ-
ing this thesis evolved to SE-Floodlight, see Section 2.4.1) is a framework to create
security network applications to control an OpenFlow network, and FLOVER (see
Section 2.4.2) is a model checking application to verify that SDN applications run
by the controller do not create contradicting flow rules or violate predefined security
constrains. Thus, Broadcast Remover is not as generic as FRESCO/SE-Floodlight
or FLOVER. In addition, Broadcast Remover is still at the theoretical level whereas
FRESCO/SE-Floodlight and FLOVER are at the moment functioning implemen-
tations. Hence, a direct comparison of abilities can not be done, yet inspection
of whether a similar implementation can be build on top of FRESCO or whether
FLOVER could be used along the Broadcast Remover, is interesting.
As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, security applications in FRESCO are created by
utilizing either the provided FRESCO modules or by creating own modules with
FRESCO’s scripting language. By combining these modules, functionalities can be
created to process OpenFlow events. Hence, by implementing functionalities from
the Broadcast Remover in the FRESCO manner, and by adding a database for the
host managing purposes, it is possible to create an implementation similarly to the
Broadcast Remover. In the end, all OpenFlow implementations consist of construc-
tion of certain flow rules upon a specific networking event. Naturally, this requires
a proper study and testing. SE-Floodlight (see Section 2.4.1) is the continuation
of FRESCO and does not primarily differ from the frameworks’ aspect. Hence,
building the Broadcast Remover upon SE-Floodlight follows similar pattern as with
FRESCO.
FLOVER is an application operating along the controller. When a new flow rule
is issued, FLOVER verifies that in the network there are no flow rules contradict-
ing each other (e.g. one rule to allow and another to deny for the same traffic).
Hence, FLOVER could run along with Broadcast Remover to verify the flow rule
production. Whereas, FRESCO/SE-Floodlight includes only flow rule production
prioritisation, FLOVER could be run even along FRESCO or SE-Floodlight to ver-
ify the flow rule production of SDN applications. Again, this needs more studying
and testing, for proper research.
4.6 Evaluation and Summary
To address the issue of broadcast thread in Ethernet legacy LAN’s, Broadcast Re-
mover is designed. The presented implementation was planned carefully, using ex-
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istent SDN properties and realistic operation models. As earlier stated, the im-
plementation functions only on IPv4 excluding IPv6 and requires only OpenFlow
supported switches. The implementation is still at the theoretical level and the next
step is to produce a real implementation by programming the application in to a
SDN controller. Testing in a simulation environment or in a physical network is
important for benchmarking and analyzing of overall performance. Also it serves
the detection of unnoticed short comings.
The Broadcast Remover addresses four types of Ethernet threats in addition to the
broadcasting:
– Man in the Middle attack, by alternating broadcast behavior, ARP and
DHCP poisoning are not more possible. Each host is directly connected to
the DHCP server and address resolution is performed at the controller instead
in the network. Also when connecting switches to the controller, only au-
thenticated switches are used and if other switches are found the port to it is
blocked.
– Host spoofing, if web based authentication provides additional protection
to the MAC based authentication. If only MAC based is used the potential
of spoofing is more likely, yet with web based authentication spoofing a host
becomes difficult. Furthermore, spoofing becomes more possible if in the net-
work statical IP addresses are used, the web based authentication is the right
solution to provide additional protection, yet general carefulness should be
applied when statical IP addresses are used.
– Denial of Service, the system can be loaded in multiple occasions with
traffic or computation inducing events which will over exhaust the system. By
following the flow rule counters, these attempts can be hindered.
– Eavesdropping, by preventing Man in the Middle attacks and hindering
spoofing attempts, eavesdropping is also prevented. Additionally, by man-
aging the port connections and restricting traffic flow from unauthenticated
hosts, eavesdropping becomes almost impossible (possible if spoofing success-
ful).
From the host point of view, the Broadcast Remover provides a secure way to gain
an IP address, request an address resolution, reliability of traffic integrity. Whereas
from the network point of view, it provides the assurance of trusted switches and
authenticate hosts.
The design shows that the usage of web based authentication is highly recommended.
It does not only reassure the identity of a host, but it provides protection from spoof-
ing attempts. For example in broadcasting, when a host is on the allowed list, the
broadcasts are allowed only from the specific port where the host is connected and
only with its identity (MAC and IP address). Here, the spoofing possibility has been
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reduced to a single point, which means that if one were to misuse this privilege, it
requires only to spoof the privileged host and to reconnect if MAC based authenti-
cation is used.
Likewise, the database (managed by the Host manager module), is fragile towards
the delays of the host disconnections. There is potential, that at the time of data
reading the database is inaccurate. Hence, when the implementation is applied in a
real environment, extensive tests should be performed for database related events.
To improve the Broadcast Remover ability to withstand the fail cases, the most
important element of the network has to be secured. This is the controller, the
linchpin of the network. It presents a point of single failure and if the controller is
compromised, all the network is. Hence, the securing of the controller physically and
with proper authentication is at most importance. For redundancy, a second con-
troller can be applied for backup purposes if the initial controller fails. The second
controller copies the state of the initial one and is ready to take immediate control.
The Broadcast Remover is designed to serve a network where the traffic integrity
and information confidentiality are required. Users need authentication and devices
are identified.
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5 Discussion and Conclusions
Currently, it seems that improving security aspects in SDN has been favored by
designing security services in the applications and the controller. Also OpenFlow
specification has shown that improving security by its standardizing influence is fa-
vorable and desirable [63]. There has been speculation on the relationship of the
controller with the applications, as to what extend of privilege sets a controller must
apply for the applications in order to prevent security exploits [64]. The security
development of the network hardware is decoupled from SDN. As SDN focuses only
on the software level of the hardware, the security aspects of the network devices
stays on the hands of the hardware suppliers.
SDN shows that it has the potential to improve current networks. SDN prevails
mainly on the link and transport layer, and similarly its security utilities. Yet, it
would be interesting to see how a high layer application could use SDN and add a
security entity to it. This area needs clearly pioneering and innovation.
Nevertheless, from the security point of view, SDN has five security focus points and
four attack targets, which are presented and introduced in the following subsections.
The points are suggested as the improving factors which need development and the
defined targets serve as guidelines when developing SDN applications.
5.1 Five Security Focus Points in Software-Defined Network-
ing
As explained in Section 2.1, SDN architecture consists of three layers: Application,
Controller, and Infrastructure. Between these layers are two interface layers:
Northbound API (between Application and Controller) and Southbound API
(between Controller and Infrastructure). Hence, for improving security in SDN,
these are the five focus points to have the attention on. In the Table 3, possible
security enforcing factors are introduced to each of the focus points.
In principle, the applications have the control of the network. Through the con-
troller, they could issue any flow rules to manage the traffic of the network. Fur-
thermore, SDN seems to follow the footsteps of computer science where the con-
troller represents the operating system, which run applications on top of it. Hence,
it is very likely that the applications are produced by a third party, making the
application reliability critical. It would not be a surprise if in the future a popu-
lar controller platform got a SDN application store, where the users could buy and
install a new feature in the network. This would probably result the emerging of
the SDN anti-virus or anti-spyware applications. Existing security implementations
such as SE-Floodlight (see Section 2.4.1) try to provide already these types of ser-
vices. It seems that the verification of the application malevolence deserves proper
attention and further study.
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The most crucial weakness of SDN is the controller. As the central entity of the
network, it represents a single point of failure, compromising the high availability
and reliability of the network. The importance of controller’s security, both from
hardware and software point of view, deserves critical attention. Mechanism and
principles should be developed for the case of controller malicious exposé or failure.
5.2 Four Attack Targets in Software-Defined Networking
When designing security services, the basic way to tackle the possible threats is
to think from an attackers’ perspective [65]. In SDN, four attack targets can be
defined:
1 A Host or the End-User. As in generally, in the networking security, the
end-users and host are probably the most desired targets. This is mainly
because they have the information, service or function to steal, tamper or
sabotage. If an attacker gets access to the target, the attacker will try to find
any vulnerabilities to perform the attack.
2 The Network. The security enforcing factors presented in each of the five
security focus points (see Table 3), can contain vulnerabilities and bugs when
implemented. This target presents the ability to alter the network configura-
tions and settings, and for example prevent end users from a service or alter
it to a fake one. An attacker would try to expose any vulnerability to take
control of the network or some part of it.
3 The Traffic. As hosts communicate, crucial information can travel through
the network which might attract an attacker. This target presents the ability
to eavesdrop traffic and steal its content. By getting access to the network, an
attacker could eavesdrop traffic by intervening or mirroring.
4 The SDN principle. As previous targets are quite generic as they also apply
to a legacy network, targets which are SDN specific are in the SDN principle.
The controller, which is the central entity of the network; OpenFlow, which is
the standardized communication method between the switches and the con-
troller; SDN applications, which is have the ability to manage and monitor the
network, these all can offer the means to access other targets or sabotaging
these elements.
Generally, in information technology, software vulnerabilities are discovered either
during development or through an expose from an external entity (either an attacker
or a user). Hence, a substantial amount of resources are used for testing while
developing software [66]. These targets provide the means for designing test cases
for security testing, when developing SDN software and especially when designing
SDN controller. These targets are not definitive, as each target can include several
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sub targets. Therefore, a proper study or a survey of an optimal testing design for
SDN paradigm is needed, especially designed for security aspects.
5.3 Conclusion
SDN can bring many advantages to improve Ethernet’s security. Due to the entity of
a central element in the network, the controller, SDN gives an extended control over
the network. Hosts connected to network can be directly recognized and managed.
Network traffic can be categorized by any parameter and routed precisely through
any route, and new features can be implemented on the fly. Ultimately, the network
can be shaped according to the demand. One could call this naively, the ultimate
network power.
Nevertheless, as the saying goes ”With great power, comes great responsibility...”,
reflects perfectly the case of SDN. As seen from the Sections 3 and 4, SDN’s ability
to control the network, removes the need of many protocols along with their vulner-
abilities, such as STP and VLAN. Other protocols (specifically link layer related)
can still be used and their weaknesses overcome. For example, ARP broadcast mes-
sages, which has spoofing vulnerabilities, can be overcome by redirecting a traffic
flow.
Then again, new vulnerabilities arise, which need meticulousness attention. For ex-
ample, the threat of the compromised controller, is a serious problem demanding a
complex solution. Compromising a controller can be achieved as easily as by slipping
a malicious SDN application into the controller. This is a known drawback when
the network transforms from distributed to a centralized network.
The existing SDN security implementation presented in Section 3, proves that the
researching community has recognized the demand for secure SDN solutions and
hence provided with a framework or a system checking solutions. There are also
other implementations which were not introduced in this thesis, yet they have a
similar purpose.
Summing up, SDN can offer more secure network if itself is properly secured. In the
end, SDN has the potential to revolutionize the network industry.
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Table 3: Some possible security enforcing factors on security focus points are listed
below.
Application layer – Verify the origin of the application
– Let application participate on authentication towards
the controller
– Verify the reliability of the controller
– State the required information needed to operate and
give privileges to access only them
– Require authorization of accessing to modify or mon-
itor the application
– Inter application communication should be done only
through the controller to support the reliability of the
application
Northbound API – Limit access to API only for authorized applications
– The inter application communication has to go
through the controller
Controller layer – Provide network information only to authenticated ap-
plications
– Create different network information levels
– Provide privileges to applications according to fore
mentioned levels
– Use secure communication with OpenFlow (TLS)
when communicating with the switches
– Check the flow rule requests from the applications,
and prevent conflicts or security violations
– Provide backup controller in case of primary fails
– Provide switches with safety run mode to perform
when connection to the controller fails
– Require authorization for accessing to modify or mon-
itor the controller
Southbound API – Use secure communication of OpenFlow (encryption
and authentication)
Infrastructure layer – Authentication to and from the controller
– Require safety mode (instruction how to perform when
controller connection fails)
– Require authorization for accessing to modify or mon-
itor the switch
– Network devices (switch and controller) placement in
a safe environment with limited access
– Secure network cabling with limited access
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